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TENDENCIES IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
since the political and
URING the four years which have elapsed
legal conversion of Justice Roberts, in the early part of the year
1937,1 remarkable changes have occurred in the judge-made part of the
United States constitution. Things which had been unconstitutional prior
to that time have become constitutional, and things which were constitutional prior to that time have become unconstitutional. The supreme court
has expressly overruled more than twelve prior decisions 2 and has impliedly
overruled many more than this. 3 On this date the judicial winds violently
shifted. A new United States constitution has emerged.
Prior to 1937 the constitution forbade minimum wages for women
either by the federal government or by the states; now it permits them
both by state and by federal fiat. Prior to 1937 the constitution gave the
states and the federal government reciprocal immunities from the taxation
of each other's instrumentalities; now it gives them reciprocal powers of
non-discriminatory taxation. Prior to 1937 the constitution forbade
multiple taxation by the states; now this is no longer forbidden. Prior to
1937 the constitution forbade the federal government to pass an A.A.A.
Act under the taxing power; now, if not then, it permits this government
to pass such a law under its police power. Prior to 1937 the constitution

D

'West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, (1937) 300 U.S. 379.
2
Collector v. Day, (1871) 11 Wall. 113, (Opinion by Nelson); Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, (1923) 261 U.S. 525, (Opinion by Sutherland); Morehead v. New York, (1936)
298 U.S. 587, (Opinion by Butler); Evans v. Gore, (1920) 253 U.S. 245, (Opinion by
Van Devanter); Miles v. Graham, (1925) 268 U.S. 501, (Opinion by McReynolds);
Colage v. Harvey, (1935) 296 U.S. 404, (Opinion by Sutherland); First National Bank of
Boston v. State of Maine, (1932) 284 U.S. 312, (Opinion by Sutherland); Swift v. Tyson,
(1842) 16 Pet. 1, (Opinion by Story); Dillon v. Gloss, (1921) 256 U.S. 368, (Opinion by
Van Devanter); Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, (1927) 273 U.S. 34 (Opinion by Butler);
Ribnik v. McBride, (1928) 277 U.S. 350 (Opinion by Sutherland); Hammer v. Dagenhart,
(1918) 247 U.S. 251 (Opinion by Day).
3
Hammer v. Dagenhart, (1918) 247 U.S. 251, (Opinion by Day); RailroadRetirement
Board v. Alton Railroad Co., (1935) 295 U.S. 330, (Opinion by Roberts); Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., (1936) 298 U.S. 238, (Opinion by Sutherland); Adair v. United States, (1908)
208 U.S. 161, (Opinion by Harlan); Coppage v. State of Kansas, (1915) 236 U.S. 1,
(Opinion by Pitney); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, (1933) 288 U.S. 344,
(Opinion by Hughes); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., (1940) 310 U.S. 150,
(Opinion by Douglas); Gitlow v. New York, (1925) 268 U.S. 652, (Opinion by Sanford);
Whitney v. California, (1927) 274 U.S. 357, (Opinion by Sanford); Davis v. Massachusetts, (1897) 167 U.S. 43, (Opinion by White); United Mine Workers v. Coronado
Coal Co., (1922) 259 U.S. 344, (Opinion by Taft); Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine
Workers, (1925) 268 U.S. 295, (Opinion by Taft).
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would not permit the federal government to regulate labour relations in
producing industries; now it permits it to do so. Prior to 1937 the constitution forbade state and federal legislation to outlaw yellow-dog contracts;
now it encourages them to do so. Prior to 1937 the constitution forbade
the federal government to tax federal judges' salaries; now there is no
such prohibition. Prior to 1937 the constitution forbade legislation permitting picketing; now it has withdrawn this prohibition. Prior to 1937
the constitution forbade the delegation of legislative power which it now
allows to be delegated. Prior to 1937 the constitution required the supreme
court to apply its own common law instead of state common law in matters
of general commercial importance; now it requires the supreme court to
apply state common law. Prior to 1937 the constitution made the United
States privileges and immunities clause protect all fundamental rights,
powers, privileges, and immunities of citizens; now it protects only those
privileges and immunities which such citizens have in relation to the federal
government.
So great were the changes that many prominent men in the United
States were filled with alarm and thought that our constitution was being
destroyed, that our capitalistic system was in process of being overthrown,
4
and that cherished liberties were to be subjected to the caprice of tyranny.
These men thought the present trends in American constitutional law were
revolutionary and dangerous.
It is very easy to discover that there was no reason for these men to be
filled with alarm. Slight investigation discloses that about all the supreme
court has done in the decisions viewed with alarm has been to reverse
decisions of the supreme court rendered by Justices Butler, McReynolds,
Sutherland, and Van Devanter in the period of so-called normalcy prior
to 1937; to overthrow the dominancy of these justices; and to make the
dissents of Holmes, Brandeis, Clark, Stone, and Cardozo the doctrines of
the court and the former majority members of the court dissenters. This
does not mean that there are no present tendencies in United States constitutional law. There are. But they cannot be understood or evaluated
without comparing them with prior trends.
The present constitution bears very little resemblance to the constitution
formulated in the constitutional convention. A few of the changes which
have occurred have been introduced by formal amendments. Most of the
changes have been made by the supreme court, which throughout the whole
4
F. J. Hogan, "Important Shifts in Constitutional Doctrines" in 25 American Bar
Association Journal (1939), at pp. 629 ff.; W. L. Wilkie, "The Court is Now His,"
(1940) 212 Sat. Eve. Post 29.

THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

LAW JOURNAL

of more than 150 years of the history of the United States constitution has
been working over and remaking it.5
United States constitutional history may be divided into the following
periods: (1) the period of the constitutional convention; (2) the period
of the original Bill of Rights; (3) the period of Chief Justice Marshall and
Justice Story from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the time of
the civil war; (4) the period of Chief Justice Taney, Justice Miller, and
Justice Waite from the civil war to the late eighties; (5) the period of
Justice Field, Chief Justice Fuller, and Justice Peckham from the late
eighties to 1910; (6) the period of Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Hughes
from 1910 to 1922; (7) the period of Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter from 1922 through 1936; (8) the period of
Justices Stone, Cardozo, and Black from 1937 to date.
Some trends in United States history can be traced through all the
periods; other trends can be traced through only certain of the constitutional periods, generally alternating. The present period resembles very
closely the period of Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Hughes; the period
of Chief Justice Taney, Justice Miller, and Justice Waite; and to some
extent the period of Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story. The period
of Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter resembled
the period of Justice Fields, Chief Justice Fuller, and Justice Peckham, and
to some extent the period of Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story.6
The great constitutional problems in American history have been: (1)
Who shall be sovereign? (2) Shall the government of the United States
be a dual form of government, or a league of states, or a strong central
government? (3) Shall there be a division of governmental powers and
functions into executive, legislative, and judicial? (4) Shall some one
branch of government be supreme, or shall each branch be independent and
co-ordinate? (5) Shall the constitution be amendable without revolution,
and if so, in what way? (6) How extensive shall citizenship and suffrage
be? (7) How far shall personal liberty be protected against public authority
or- social control?
Constitutional development has related to these
problems.
The writer has concluded to treat the question of constitutional trends
from the standpoint of topics. In taking the matter up in this way, the
trend of constitutional law with reference to each topic will have to be
5

H. E. Willis, The Constitution of the United States at the End of One Hundred Fifty

Years (Bloomington, Indiana, 1939); H. E. Willis, "The Part of the United States
Constitution Made by the Supreme Court" in 23 Iowa Law Review (1938), at pp. 165 ff.
6H. E. Willis, "Constitution Making by the Supreme Court since March 29, 1937"
in 15 Indiana Law Journal (1940), at pp. 179 ff.
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traced through all the periods instead of all of the periods through the topics.
The topics to be considered will be sovereignty, amendability, universal
citizenship and suffrage, separation of powers, dual form of government,
supremacy of the supreme court, and protection of personal liberty against
social control.
The only topics, or doctrines, placed in the constitution by the constitutional convention and by formal amendments were those of separation of
powers, amendability, universal citizenship and suffrage, and protection
of personal liberty against social control. The topics, or doctrines, of dual
form of government and supremacy of the supreme court were placed in
the constitution by the supreme court through Chief Justice Marshall. The
topic, or doctrine, of popular sovereignty has been placed in the constitution
by the continuing work of justices in all the periods from the time of Chief
Justice Jay, through Chief Justice Marshall, down to the present justices.
However, the doctrines placed in the constitution by the constitutional
convention and by formal amendments have been so worked over by the
supreme court that they are almost as much a product of the supreme
court as the doctrines made solely by it. It should also be noted that
justices in different periods have not differed as to the fact of constitutional
doctrines but as to their scope and application.
SOVEREIGNTY

So far as concerns sovereignty, the general tendency of American constitutional law has been in the direction of narrowing the definition of
sovereignty and of placing the location of sovereignty in the people of the
United States as a whole. The supreme court has not been so much
concerned with the definition of sovereignty as with its location, but a
narrow definition that "the very meaning of sovereignty is that the decree
of the sovereign 'makes law" was adopted in the period of Holmes, Brandeis,
and Hughes and this still stands. 7 Probably the position of the constitutional convention was that the people of the United States as a whole are
sovereign. This is shown by the preamble of the constitution and by its
adoption by conventions in the various states. However, the constitution
itself is silent upon the subject and for this reason the establishment of the
doctrine has taken long years of struggle and discussion.
The first judicial pronouncement upon the subject was made by Chief
Justice John Jay in the early case of Chisholm v. Georgia.' Chief Justice
Jay was of the opinion that both sovereignty and the unappropriated lands
of the country passed from England to the whole people; and for this
'American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., (1909) 213 U.S. 347, 358.
8(1793) 2 Dall. 419.

THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL

reason he held that a state was liable for its wrongful acts and could be
sued by a citizen of another state although a private individual. This
decision aroused so much opposition that the formal eleventh amendment
was added to the United States constitution. However, this amendment
only repudiated the liability of a state to be sued by a citizen of another
state. It did not change Jay's doctrine of sovereignty. The states were
still liable to suit by another state and by the United States. Chief Justice
Jay did not decide whether the people of a specific state had some residual
sovereignty.
For a long time after Chief Justice Jay there was dispute as to where
sovereignty resided. Thomas Jefferson and Spencer Roane in particular
took the position that the United -States constitution was a compact
between the states (or the people of the states) and the federal government, and that under this compact there was a divided sovereignty, part
of it being in the federal government and part of it being in the state
governments. Chief Justice Marshall had the same point of view with
reference to sovereignty which had been championed by Chief Justice Jay. 9
He, like Jay, felt that all sovereign power resided in the people and not in
the states and that the general government's powers were delegated to it
by the people rather than by the states and that as a consequence "it is a
government of all, its powers were delegated by all, and it represented
all." Marshall probably believed in the complete sovereignty of the people
as a whole, although he did not decide whether or not there is some
residual sovereignty in the people of each state. President Monroe
certainly believed in the sovereignty of the people as a whole. 10
Chief Justice Marshall's position was not immediately accepted by all
political leaders. President Andrew Jackson struck a blow at state
sovereignty. However, in this general period secession was threatened by
Massachusetts, by all the New England states, and by South Carolina, on
the theory that each of them was sovereign and could withdraw from the
Union if it chose to do so. Chief Justice Taney held in the case of the
Rhode Island rebellion that the question of whether or not a state had a
"republican form of government" was a political question for congress
(or for the president) rather than for the supreme court." The Missouri
compromise went on the theory of a confederation of the states. The civil
war climaxed the development of the states' rights, or state sovereignty
'Marbury v. Madison, (1803) 1 Cranch 137; M'Culloch v. Maryland, (1819) 4
Wheat. 316.
11H. C. Hockett, The Constitutional History of the United States, 1826-1876 (New
York, 1939), p. 17.
"Luther v. Borden, (1849) 7 How. 1.
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doctrine, for secession was grounded on the theory of state sovereignty
and that the compact between the states and the federal government had
been broken by the other party to the compact. However, the Union cause
was grounded on the theory of popular sovereignty and on the coercive
power of the federal government to act on individuals and to suppress
insurrection. The triumph of the Union forces in the civil war destroyed
state sovereignty. President Abraham Lincoln followed President Jackson
in regarding the secessionists as citizens of the United States and not
members of a state corporation. Yet Chief Justice Chase in an opinion
rendered after the civil war wrote, "The Constitution looks to an indestructible Union of indestructible states."' 12
Not much more development in the doctrine of sovereignty occurred
until the time of Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Hughes. In the time of
these men the supreme court finally and definitely took the position that
in the United States sovereignty resides in the people as a whole, that
neither the states nor the people of the states as such are sovereign, but
that the people of the whole country as organized in our form of government possess all the sovereign power possessed by anybody in the United
States.' 3 For this reason the people of the United States as a whole could
impose the nineteenth amendment on Maryland and the eighteenth amendment on Connecticut and Rhode Island in spite of the fact that the people
of those states did not vote therefor. The people of the United States as
a whole, under the amending power, could take from the states any sovereign powers which they had been exercising and delegate them to the
federal government though it might thereby entirely destroy all dual form
of government. The correct present constitutional doctrine therefore is
that neither the federal government nor the state governments are sovereign,
but each is only an agency of the sovereign people, exercising those powers
which the latter have seen fit to delegate to them to exercise. The power
to give is the power to take away. This logic finally sounded the death
blow to any doctrine of state sovereignty ;1 and this position of the supreme
court has at last been generally accepted by the country as a whole and is
the doctrine at the present time. Of course the twenty-first amendment
repealed the eighteenth amendment, but the twenty-first amendment worked
no change in the doctrine of sovereignty.
"Texas v. White, (1868) 7 Wall. 700, 724-5; but cf. White v. Hart, (1871) 13 Wall.

646.

"3AmericanBanana Co. v. United Fruit Co., (1909) 213 U.S. 347; Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
(1886) U.S. 356.
"National Prohibition Cases, (1920) 253 U.S. 350; Hawke v. Smith, (1920) 253
U.S. 221; Leser v. Garnett, (1922) 258 U.S. 130; United States v. Sprague, (1931) 282
U.S. 716; Missouri v. Holland, (1920) 252 U.S. 416; Perry v. United States, (1935) 294
U.S. 330.
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DUAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT

So far as concerns dual form of government in the United States, there
has been no general tendency throughout United States history except so
far as concerns foreign relations. Rather the tendency has been for constitutional development to swing back and forth, now towards favouring
the states and now towards favouring the federal government. At the
present time the tendency seems to be favouring both governments, but if
any preference is shown, it is in favour of the state governments. So far
as concerns foreign relations, the trend has been in the direction of federal
power until now as to them; there is no dual form of government."
In the beginning the tendency was toward the establishment of the
doctrine of a dual form of government itself. The constitutional convention
did not expressly write into the original constitution a doctrine of a dual
form of government, although it put into this document most of the materials
which were later used in the making of the doctrine. In the post-constitutional convention period the doctrine of a dual form of government was
probably accepted. Hamilton, on the one hand, really did not desire a
dual form of government but a strong central government with the states
merely administrative units of the federal government, as counties and
cities are administrative units of the state governments; but after the
adoption of the original constitution, he probably assumed that a dual form
of government either was implicit in the original constitution or would
gradually emerge. Jefferson and Roane, on the other hand, desired merely
a league of the states rather than a dual form of government; but they,
like Hamilton, probably realized that the original constitution contemplated
more than what they desired. Chief Justice John Marshall is entitled to
more credit than anyone else for the establishment of a dual form of government in the United States and for the enlargement of federal powers.
This he did in two of his most celebrated decisions. One involved the
commerce power' 6 and the other involved the implied powers of the federal
government.

7

But at first, in spite of his famous decisions, his doctrine was not
generally accepted. Jefferson, for example, continued to maintain that the
federal government had no implied powers, that the word "necessary" in
the constitution meant absolutely necessary, and therefore the federal
government had no implied power to acquire territory. The Kentucky
and Virginia resolutions sponsored by Jefferson championed state sovereignty, although as a matter of fact the supreme court under the first
15United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., (1936) 299 U.S. 304.
"Gibbons
v. Ogden, (1824) 9 Wheat. 1.
' 7 M'Culloch v. Maryland, (1819) 4 Wheat. 316.
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Judiciary Act was exercising jurisdiction over state courts. The Missouri
compromise rested on the assumption that the United States was a confederation of states and that it could not impose conditions on territories
for admission to the Union. Calhoun and even Pinkney championed this
viewpoint. They also held that newly acquired territory was the common
property of the states.
According to Marshall neither the states nor the federal government
was sovereign. Sovereignty resided in the people and both the state
governments and the federal government were agencies of the sovereign
people. The sovereign people, by means of the federal constitution, had
made a division of governmental powers between these two agencies. But
Marshall took the position that the federal government had not only the
powers expressly given to it, but all other powers necessary and proper
to carry out the express powers so given, and that in case of conflict
between the powers given to the federal government and the powers given,
or reserved, to the states, the powers of the federal government would
prevail over the powers of the states. He thereby established within the
doctrine of a dual form of government another doctrine of federal
supremacy.
In the period of Chief Justice Taney and Justice Miller the supreme
court continued judicially to uphold the doctrine of a dual form of government as established by Chief Justice Marshall, except for his doctrine of
federal supremacy. Chief Justice Taney, contrary to expectation, did not
undertake to establish state sovereignty; he even took a liberal position
with reference to the admiralty power of the federal government. I" Yet
he believed in the concurrent power of the states and the federal government over interstate commerce, and in the matter of social control favoured
the states and their police power not only over the subject of slavery 9 but
Justice Miller championed much the same position.
over corporations."
He refused to extend the scope of the United States privilgees and immunities clause. 2 Other justices of this period agreed with this point of
view. They created a doctrine of reciprocal immunity from taxation by
both the state and federal governments of the instrumentalities of each
other.22 Yet in this period the court enlarged the powers of the federal
government in the case of admiralty, interstate commerce,2 3 and legal
tender.

24

18The Propeller Genesee Chief, et al. v. Henry Fitzhugh, et al., (1854) 12 How. 443.
1

Dred Scott v. Sandford, (1857) 19 How. 393.

"0The Charles River Bridge v. The Warren Bridge et al., (1837) 11 Pet. 420.
21
Slaughter-House Cases, (1873) 16 Wall. 36.
22
Collector v. Day, (1871) 11 Wall. 113.
23
Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, (1851) 12 How. 299.
24
Legal Tender Cases, (1871) 12 Wall. 457; Juilliardv. Greenman, (1884) 110 U.S. 421.
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The great battle over a dual form of government, as over sovereignty,
of course occurred in connexion with the civil war.

The secession of the

southern states was grounded on the doctrine of state sovereignty though
by conventions of the people of the states. These southern states claimed
either that they simply withdrew by nullification the power of some agents
whom they had theretofore constituted; or that they merely dissolved a
partnership entered into between them and the federal government, because
of its violation by the federal government. The position of the Union was
grounded on the doctrine of popular sovereignty and the power of the
federal government to suppress insurrections. It undertook to act not on
the states as states but on the individuals as citizens of the United States.
This coercive action had been used by Washington in the case of the
Whiskey rebellion, by Jefferson in the case of his embargo, and by Jackson
in the case of South Carolina. President Buchanan took the position that
the Union was perpetual and the United States had power to protect its
own property, yet he did not protect it. Lincoln took the position that the
states had no status except in the Union, that they could not secede from the
Union without violating the constitution, and that the Union was older
and had created the states. He, however, apparently agreed that sovereignty
resided not in the Union but in the people of the country as a whole and
that the Union was only exercising powers given to it by this sovereignty.
He developed the federal war-power so as to establish the law of treason,
the law of belligerent rights, the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus,
and the power to confiscate property and emancipate the slaves. When he
confiscated property, it was not on the theory of rebellion but under the
war power. The final triumph of the Union cause and the creation of
dual citizenship by the fourteenth amendment tended firmly to establish
the doctrine of a dual form of government. 25 Since that time, Marshall's
doctrine of a dual form of government has been accepted not only by the
judicial, but by all other branches of the United States government and
by all United States leaders and political thinkers; and the battle has been
over whether to favour the states or th federal government, i.e., where to
strike a balance between their powers.
In the period of Field, Fuller, and Peckham the tendency was to
enlarge the powers of the federal government, perhaps because the state
governments were active and the federal was not. This was done through
the further extension ofi implied powers, 6 through the enlargement of the
25
H. C. Hockett, The Constitutional History of the United States, 1826-1876 (New
York, 1939), pp. 253-324.
26
United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., (1896) 160 U.S. 668.
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commerce power of the federal government, 27 and through the extension
under the due process clause of the judicial power of the United States
over matters of substance2" and to the protection of corporations.29 Yet
in this period the supreme court also enlarged the powers of the state
governments by giving them the privilege of exercising their general
police power where it only indirectly or incidentally affected interstate
commerce, 30 but this was over the dissents of Justice Field and Chief
Justice Fuller. During this period the supreme court upheld Marshall's
doctrine of federal supremacy both so far as concerned the police power 2 '
and as concerned the power of eminent domain,2 but they did not overthrow the doctrine of reciprocal immunity from taxation established in
the period of Taney, Miller, and Waite in the case of Collector v. Day.
In the period of Holmes, Brandeis, and Hughes the tendency was more
towards the protection of the powers of the states through controlling the
supreme court's power of judicial review.3 3 Yet in this period the supreme
court helped to enlarge the treaty power34 and the war power

3

of the

federal government.
In the period of Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van
Devanter, somewhat as in the time of Justice Field, the tendency was to
limit both the power of state governments3 6 and the powers of the federal
government.3 7 This action of the court raised a suspicion that it was more
concerned with the protection of private business than it was with the
doctrine of a dual form of government. This tendency to limit the powers
of the federal government was manifested: (1) by applying the tenth
amendment to the federal commerce power, (2) by requiring a physical
movement of goods across state lines for interstate commerce, (3) by
27

Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway Co. v. People of the State of Illinois, (1886)
118 U.S.
557; Leisy v. Hardin, (1890) 135 U.S. 100.
2
1The Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Co. v. The State of Minnesota ex rel.,
(1890) 134 U.S. 418; Allgeyer et al.v. State of Louisiana, (1897) 165 U.S. 578; Lochner v.
People of the State of New York, (1905) 198 U.S. 45.
29
The Minneapolis and St. Louis Railway Co. v. Beckwith, (1889) 129 U.S. 26;
Covington and Lexington Turnpike Road Co. et al. v. Sandford et al., (1896) 164 U.S. 578.
20
Plumley v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, (1894) 155 U.S. 461.
3lHouston, East and West Texas Railway Co. and Texas and Pacific Railway Co.
et al. v. United States, (1914) 234 U.S. 342.
2United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., (1896) 160 U.S. 668.
"3Bunting v. State of Oregon, (1917) 243 U.S. 426; Minnesota Rate Cases, (1913)
230 U.S. 352.
4Missouri v. Holland, (1920) 252 U.S. 416.
- 5Selective Draft Law Cases, (1918) 245 U.S. 366.
36Colgate v. Harvey, (1935) 296 U.S. 404.
"Adkins v. Children's Hospital, (1923) 261 U.S. 525; Morehead v. New York,
(1936) 298 U.S. 587.
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defining commerce in narrow terms, and (4) by a narrow approach to-8
wards the facts making intrastate matters affect interstate commerce.'
Today the tendency is in the direction of enlarging the tax powers and
the police powers of both the states and the United States, but the states
are being favoured more than the United States. For example, instead
of a doctrine of reciprocal immunity from taxation there has been established a doctrine of reciprocal taxation of the instrumentalities of each
other by both the states3" and the United States,4 ° and the supreme court
has permitted the state of the buyer to levy use and sales taxes on goods
shipped in interstate commerce. 4 The case of Colgate v. Harvey has been
overruled and the limitation placed by this decision on the power of the
states under the United States privileges and immunities clause has been
abrogated.42 However, in this period the court has extended the doctrine
of federal supremacy again into the field of reciprocal taxation, and in
doing so has overruled the case of Collector v. Day and restored Chief
Justice Marshall's doctrine of federal supremacy. 43 In the matter of
federal police power the tendency is not to question the hidden motives of
the legislative branch, nor to require a physical movement of goods for
interstate commerce, but to define commerce in broad terms and to abandon
the narrow approach and consider the substantial effect of intrastate activity
on interstate commerce.44
Yet the no man's land, where there is no governmental power, continues; certain states are incorporating entities to prey on other states and
granting divorces for the citizens of other states contrary to the policy of
such states; trade barriers and ports of entry are becoming the order of
the day; and the federal courts must apply state common law even when
there is need of a uniform rule.
Thus, while the doctrine of a dual form of government was finally
established, the relations between the states and the United -States within
the dual form of government have not been finally or correctly established.
"Hammer v. Dagenhart, (1918) 247 U.S. 251; Ware and Leland v. Mobile County,
(1908) 209 U.S. 405; United States v. E. C. Knight Co., (1895) 135 U.S. 1; Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., (1936) 298 U.S. 238.
"James v. Dravo Contracting Co., (1937) 302 U.S. 134.
4
'Allen v. The Regents of the University System of Georgia, (1938) 304 U.S. 439.
"lHenneford v. Silas Mason Co., (1937) 300 U.S. 577; McGoldrick v. Berwind-White
Coal Mining Co., (1939) 309 U.S. 33.
2
Madden v. Kentucky, (1940) 309 U.S. 83.
43
Pittman v. The Home Owners Loan Corp., (1939) 308 U.S. 21.
4Sonzinsky v. United States, (1937) 300 U.S. 506; Currinv. Wallace, (1939) 306
U.S. 1; Electric Bond and Share Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, (1938) 303
U.S. 419; National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., (1937)
301 U.S. 1.
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The powers of now one, now the other have been enlarged or diminished
as the personnel of the supreme court has changed. The present enlargement of the powers of the states is causing conflicts between the various
states and between them and the United States and is creating trade
barriers to industry and commerce, which can sooner or later only cause
a revulsion. To favour the federal government either for a while or perinanently will not solve the problem. It begins to look as though either
a great many more powers will have to be transferred to congress, or the
dual form of government itself will have to be entirely abolished by making
the states only administrative units.
SEPARATION OF POWERS

In the matter of separation of powers, the general tendency of American
constitutional law has been in the direction of establishing the supremacy
of the supreme court over the other branches of government with the
consequent enlargement of the power of judicial review; of creating a
great number of administrative commissions and executive tribunals with
the consequent modification of the doctrines against the delegation and
commingling of functions; and of generally breaking down the divisions of
functions. The present tendency in all but the first of these directions is
pronounced.
The doctrine -of separation of powers has always been a doctrine of
American constitutional law. It was established by the constitutional convention-not in so many words but by necessary implication. As thus
established it included three branches of government, corresponding governmental functions, a scheme of checks and balances, and independency
of the different branches of government. Apparently this constitutional
doctrine meant: (1) that each governmental function should be exercised
by the branch of government corresponding with such function, except as
this was changed by the scheme of checks and balances, (2) that no branch
of government could delegate its functions to another branch; (3) that all
three functions of government could not be commingled in any one branch;
and (4) that each branch of government was co-ordinate and independent
of the others. This was a very unscientific if not unworkable scheme of
separation of powers, and the subsequent history of American constitutional
law has for the most part related to changes and adjustments to make the
scheme adjust itself to unanticipated and expanding needs of government.
One of the growths not anticipated by the constitutional convention has
been the growth of an administrative branch of government. Yet this
has not been made a fourth branch of government, but it has very largely
been absorbed and become a part of the executive branch of government.
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Washington instituted the administrative branch of government when he
established a cabinet.
One of the most bothersome problems connected with separation of
powers has been the problem of the independency of the different branches
of government. Apparently the constitutional convention contemplated
such independency. Jefferson and his followers championed it. However,
very early in United States history this doctrine was broken down by what
appeared like the substitution for it of a doctrine of legislative supremacy.
Congress undertook to assume a position of supremacy over the other
branches of government, and what occurred in connexion with the federal
government also occurred throughout the United States in connexion with
the various state governments, which also subscribed to the same doctrine
of separation of powers. The legislatures throughout the United States
assumed jurisdiction over the matter of legal procedure and the admission
and disbarment of attorneys. They even went so far as to grant new trials
for cases tried in courts of law. 4" This encroachment by 4 6the legislative
upon the judicial branch was not checked until recent times.
Chief Justice Marshall introduced a different doctrine, and that was
the doctrine of judicial supremacy and in particular the supremacy of the
United States supreme court. This he did by holding that the supreme
court could declare an act of congress unconstitutional and pass on the
constitutionality of acts of the executive branch of government,4 7 and by
holding that the supreme court could exercise the same supremacy over
all three branches of the various state governments.
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Marshall's doctrine of judicial supremacy did not at once completely
settle the question of the independency of the branches of government.
Independency of the branches of government continued to have its
champions. Legislative supremacy continued in the combat. Executive
supremacy at different times entered the combat with many evidences of
success. Jackson used his veto power not only when he thought legislation unconstitutional but when he thought it was unwise; and he introduced the spoils system, which at first at least gave some advantage to
the executive branch of government. During the civil war executive
supremacy prevailed. Under Lincoln the writ of habeas corpus was
suspended, martial law established, courts-martial exercised a general
4

'Baltimore etc. R. R. v. Grant, (1878) 98 U.S. 398; Green v. Jersey City, (1880)
118; Wheeler's Appeal, (1877) 45 Conn. 306.
42 N.J.L.
4
State v. Cannon, (1932) 206 Wis. 374; People v. Callopy, (1934) 358 Ill. 11; Bronx
Brass Foundry v. Irving Trust Co., (1936) 297 U.S. 230.
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Marbury v. Madison, (1803) 1 Cranch 137.
"Fletcher v. Peck, (1810) 6 Cranch 87; Cohens v. Virginia, (1821) 6 Wheat. 264.

See also the recent case of Sterling v. Constantin, (1932) 287 U.S. 378.

TENDENCIES IN

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

jurisdiction, and the military power was made supreme. During the world
war much the same thing occurred under President Wilson. During the
great depression President Roosevelt was thought by many to be in the
process of establishing executive supremacy, until the supreme court took
the matter in hand. The executive branch of the government is supreme
over the pardoning power and the removal of most officers. 9 In the
reconstruction days after the civil war, legislative supremacy again prevailed for a short time. Even today the legislative branch of the government is supreme over some matters, like the seating of senators and
representatives, political questions, and a republican form of government.

Yet the supreme court, with the possible exception of the war powers
creating executive supremacy, has won a permanent victory in this respect
over the other branches of government.
While the supreme court has thus been destroying the doctrine of
independency of the various departments and establishing in place thereof
the doctrine of the supremacy of the supreme court, it has also modified all
of the other original characteristics of the doctrine of separation of powers
so that it has introduced more changes than did the constitutional convention in its scheme of checks and balances' 0 In particular, it has permitted
the delegation of legislative and other powers to executive tribunals so that
now all of the functions of government may be commingled and exercised

by them. And while such justices as Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and
Van Devanter subjected the decisions of these tribunals to the most exacting judicial review, 1 the present justices of the supreme court are more
inclined to allow the findings of fact of such tribunals to stand without
5 2

judicial review.

With the growth of an urban and industrial civilization and the problems
created by the conflicting interests of millions of people thrown into close
contact with each other, there has arisen a need, first, for a regulating or
co-ordinating activity and, second, for a volume of detailed rules and regulations with which the legislative branch of the government is not fitted to
cope. Executive tribunals and administrative commissions are better
calculated to discharge these functions satisfactorily than is a legislative
body. The great problem has been how to fit these tribunals into the
constitutional scheme of separation of powers. Conservatives in the legal
49

Ex ParteGrossman, (1925) 267 U.S. 87; Myers v. United States, (1926) 272 U.S. 52.
5"Ex Parte Grossman, (1925) 267 U.S. 87.
"1Crowell v. Benson, (1932) 285 U.S. 22.
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profession have been inclined to apply to these many tribunals the old rules
as to separation of powers, but the liberals have been inclined to take the
position that these new tribunals need new rules, abrogating the rule as
to delegation of powers and the rule as to commingling of functions. They
believe that experience has shown that the commingling of powers in
administrative tribunals is almost necessary for their success. They also
feel that there is no need of applying to administrative tribunals the general
principles which have been made to apply to the three regular branches
of government. The reason for the doctrine of separation of powers is
the prevention of tyranny and the consequent destruction of liberty. There
can be no danger of this sort from administrative tribunals, so long as they
are creatures of, and can be destroyed by, the legislative branch of the
government any time. It now looks as though the position of the liberals
in the legal profession is going to triumph. Delegation of legislative power
is now constitutional if congress sets forth its policy and many executive
tribunals are creating social control, administering it, and deciding whether
and how it applies to specific persons.
A very recent tendency in American constitutional law, so far as it
involves separation of powers, is the subjection of th6 federal judges to
income taxes upon their salaries. In the period of Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter it had been thought that the
doctrine of separation of powers as well as an express provision in the
constitution as to the diminishing of their salaries required the exemption
of judges from income taxes."
However, the present supreme court has
taken the position that this was a bad piece of legal reasoning and has
changed the constitutional law upon the subject. 4
SUPREMACY

OF THE SUPREME

COURT

The general tendency of American constitutional law, as to the
supremacy of the supreme court, has been in the direction of developing
and broadening this doctrine, until now (except for a new trend beginning) the supreme court settles questions of social policy and reviews the
findings of law and fact of administrative tribunals. This doctrine is really
an exception to the United States doctrine of separation of powers and
the history of its development has already been set forth in connexion with
the topic of "Separation of Powers."
There is nothing in the original constitution upon the subject. The
original constitution did not choose any umpire or arbitrator for disputes
between the various branches of the federal government, or between the
5

3Evans v. Gore, (1920) 253 U.S. 245; Miles v. Graham, (1925) 268 U.S. 501.
O'Malley v. Woodrough, (1939) 307 U.S. 277.
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federal government and the states, or between these governments and
individuals. The establishment of the doctrine as one of the fundamental
characteristics of American constitutional law has been due to the work
of the justices of the United States supreme court. They have taken the
power to themselves.
Jefferson was of the opinion that there was no constitutional arbitrator
either between the various branches of the federal government, or between
the federal government and the states. He also took the position that the
supreme court had no appellate jurisdiction over the state courts, and that
the supreme court had no amending power. He felt that one branch of the
federal government had as much right as another to decide as to the nature
of its powers, and that the states had as much right as the federal government to decide conflicts between them. If anything, he probably thought
that the final power was lodged either in the legislatures (or the people)
of three-fourths of the states, or in the absence of action by them in an
individual state. The Kentucky and Virginia resolutions followed this
philosophy. Madison thought that it might be implied that the supreme
court was an arbitrator between the states and the nation, but not between
the branches of the United States. Pennsylvania urged an amendment to
the constitution for the establishing of an impartial tribunal to arbitrate
between the states and the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall, as we have already shown, is entitled to credit
for the doctrine of the supremacy of the supreme court, both over other
branches of the federal government55 and over the various branches of the
state government.", But throughout United States history, no matter what
the period, other justices of the United States supreme court have been
practically unanimous in following the position of Chief Justice Marshall.
Chief Justice Taney, if possible, went even further in upholding the
doctrine than did Chief Justice Marshall, 7 except so far as concerns
political questions.5 8 Justice Miller and other associates of Chief Justice
Taney followed in his footsteps. In this period the supreme court overruled acts of congress passed for the protection of negroes,5 9 but it upheld
the separation of powers to the extent of refusing to mandamus the president.6" Justices Field and Peckham and Chief Justice Fuller of the next
5Marbury v. Madison, (1803) 1 Cranch 137.
'Fletcher v. Peck, (1810) 6 Cranch 87; Cohens v. Virginia, (1821) 6 Wheat. 264.
57
The Charles River Bridge v. The Warren Bridge et al., (1837) 11 Pet. 420; Dred
Scott v. Sandford, (1857) 19 How. 393; Ableman v. Booth, (1859) 21 How. 506.
"Luther v. Borden, (1849) 7 How. 1.
59Civil Rights Cases, (1883) 109 U.S. 3.
"State of Mississippi v. Johnson, (1866) 4 WaIl 475.
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constitutional period did more than even Chief Justice Taney to develop
the supremacy of the-supreme court. This they did in a conspicuous way
in creating the power of judicial review over matters of substance so as to
exercise the function of determining social policy.61 While Justices
Holmes, Hughes, and Brandeis in the next period believed in practising
voluntary self-restraint in the exercise of the power of judicial review,
they did not at any time question the fact of the power,62 and they aided
the growth of administrative agencies by permitting a new delegation and
commingling of powers."5 In the next period Justices Butler, McReynolds,
Sutherland, and Van Devanter pressed judicial review both of Acts of
legislatures and of findings of administrative tribunals if possible even
further than did Justices Field, Peckham, and Chief Justice Fuller. 4 The
present justices have overruled many of the decisions dictated by Justices
Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter and have been inclined
to exercise the same voluntary restraint on their power which Justices
Holmes and Brandeis exercised, but none of them has indicated that he
wants to surrender the power of judicial review or his supremacy over the
other branches of the federal government. 5 This unanimous judicial
opinion has finally established the supremacy of the supreme court as a
permanent and most characteristic distinction of United States constitutional law. The fact that the supreme court can at any time assert its
supremacy over the other branches of government, as it did in the case of
President F. D. Roosevelt,6 6 shows that the doctrine of the supremacy of
the supreme court is in no danger of overthrow.
The people of the United States now not only acquiesce in the exercise
of this overlordship by the United States supreme court, but they believe
that the supreme court should have it and is the one branch of government
that has exercised its powers in commendable fashion. The only questions
in this connexion are with reference to whether the supreme court instead
61

Allgeyer et al. v. State of Louisiana, (1897) 165 U.S. 578; The Chicago, Milwaukee
and St. PaulRailway Co. v. The State of Minnesota, ex rel., (1890) 134 U.S. 418; Lochner v.
People of the State of New York, (1905) 198 U.S. 45.
6Schenck v. United States, (1919) 249 U.S. 47.
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United States v. Grimaud, (1911) 220 U.S. 506.

"4United Railways and Electric Company of Baltimore v. West, (1930) 280 U.S. 234;
McCardlev. Indianapolis Water Co., (1926) 272 U.S. 400; Adkins v. Children'sHospital,
(1923) 261 U.S. 525; Morehead v. People of New York ex rel. Tipaldo, (1936) 298 U.S. 587;
United States v. Butler, (1936) 297 U.S. 1; Crowell v. Benson, (1932) 285 U.S. 22; Railroad
Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co., (1935) 295 U.S. 330.
6Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, (1938) 304 U.S. 64; McGoldrick v. BerwindWhite Coal Mining Co., (1939) 309 U.S. 33; National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and
Laughlin Steel Corp., (1937) 301 U.S. 1.
66
A. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, (1935) 295 U.S. 495.

TENDENCIES

IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

of legislatures should determine questions of social policy, and whether the
supreme court instead of administrative tribunals should determine questions of fact.
The supreme court has determined social policy only about sixty years.
Justice Field more than anyone else was responsible for the supreme court
taking to itself this power. Many think that so far as matters of this sort
are concerned, legislative judgement is fully as good as the judicial judgement; and that it might have been wise for the supreme court never to
have taken the power. The chief criticisms of the decisions of the supreme
court have occurred in connexion with its decisions on matters of social
policy. If the court should cease to exercise this power, it would probably
help its prestige. If the supreme court did not have the power to arbitrate
between the states and the federal government and between the various
branches of the federal government, there is a very great likelihood .that
the United States form of government might go to pieces, and the United
States constitution fail as a great fabric of democratic government; but to
have the supreme court cease to determine matters of social policy would
have no effect upon either the American form of government or the United
States constitution. However, there is no present indication that the
supreme court is likely to put this voluntary limitation upon itself; but
there are many organizations in the United States which are beginning to
advocate an amendment to the United States constitution which would
have this effect.
The effectiveness of the work of administrative tribunals is largely
destroyed by substituting an independent judicial determination for
administrative finality, and there are indications that the present supreme
court is going to limit judicial review in this field.
AMENDABILITY

In the matter of amendability, American constitutional law has tended
in the direction of broadening the scope and simplifying the method of
amendment, even to giving the supreme court amending powers.
The doctrine of amendability of the constitution was a doctrine created
by the original constitution. But if it had not been for the work of the
supreme court in improving it, there are many indications that the constitution would never have endured for the more than 150 years of its existence.
Yet Jefferson and Madison believed that no changes in the American constitution should be made except by formal amendments. They probably
were voicing the attitude of the constitutional convention. Luckily they
did not voice the need of the people of the United States, nor the best
constitutional policy.
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The supreme court has broadened and simplified the methods of amending the constitution by doing two different things. In the first place it has
clarified and interpreted the provisions in the original constitution so as to
eliminate inconsistencies and obscurities. Thus it has held that the legislatures of the states in acting under the amending power are not acting
as agencies of the state governments but as agencies of the amending
process; that neither the president's approval of a proposal of an amendment nor the governor's approval of a ratification of an amendment is
necessary ;', and that there are no implied limitations upon the amending
power.6 8
In the second place the supreme court, under the doctrine of the
supremacy of the supreme court, has taken to itself the power to amend
even the constitution. This action by the supreme court is more significant
and important than what it did in the matter of clarifying and interpreting
the express provisions in the constitution. By itself amending the constitution, the supreme court has made it easy to modify and change it to keep it
abreast with economic and social developments and to make it a workable
document for new and unanticipated situations. The power thus to amend
the constitution was begun to be exercised in the time of Chief Justice
Marshall and has continued throughout United States constitutional history
and is as great a present as it has been a past tendency. Among some of
the amendments to the United States constitution made by the supreme
court may be mentioned the establishment of the doctrine of sovereignty
of the people of the United States as a whole, the establishment of the
supremacy of the supreme court, the establishment of a dual form of
government, a definition of interstate commerce, the determination of the
powers of the federal government and the state governments with reference
to interstate commerce (dual form of government), the protection of
religious liberty and freedom of speech and the press against state action,
the guarantee of certain forms of legal procedure against state action, and
the limitations on state and federal action by the due process clause as a
matter of substance (protection of personal liberty against social control).
UNIVERSAL CITIZENSHIP AND

SUFFRAGE

The tendency of American constitutional law so far as it involves the
doctrine of universal citizenship and suffrage has tended in the direction
of widening citizenship and suffrage.
67Hawke v. Smith, (1920) 253 U.S. 221; Smiley v. Holm, (1932) 285 U.S. 355.
68
Leser v. Garnett, (1922) 258 U.S. 130; National Prohibition Cases, (1920) 253
U.S. 350; United States v. Sprague, (1931) 282 U.S. 716.
69H. E. Willis, ConstitutionalLaw of the United States (Bloomington, Indiana, 1936),
chap. iv.
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The original United States constitution did not prescribe or proscribe
either political, or social, or economic democracy. The people of the
United States have not as yet attained either social, or economic democracy.
There are social classes in the United States somewhat as there are in
England. The shrewd and unscrupulous have succeeded in creating an
economic plutocracy on the basis of a professed democracy. But gradually
the people of the United States have achieved a political democracy. This
was first begun in the time of President Jackson. At first in the United
States political power had been given only to the rich and well-born, that
is the property owners. But the states of the Mississippi valley began to
extend suffrage; then Maryland, South Carolina, Massachusetts, and New
York adopted white manhood suffrage (partly to prevent the migration
of wage workers). Finally the fourteenth amendment to the United
States constitution gave universal citizenship, and the fifteenth and nineteenth amendments established universal suffrage, except as non-discriminatory qualifications might be required of all."0
Of course as a practical matter neither citizenship nor suffrage is
universal. There are many aliens residing in the United States who are
not citizens either of the United States, or of any state. There are many
citizens in the United States who either because of non-discriminatory
requirements, or because of subversive requirements, or because of sheer
71
neglect on their own part do not participate in the elective franchise.
This, however, does not change the constitutional fact, which is that under
72
the United States constitution there is universal citizenship and suffrage.
PROTECTION

OF PERSONAL

LIBERTY

AGAINST

SOCIAL

CONTROL

The general tendency in American constitutional law, though the
tendency has swung back and forth in different periods, has been to protect
personal liberty more and more against control or destruction by other
organized or unorganized private individuals and less and less (except as
to fundamental rights) against control by government.
While the United States has never been a land of either social or
economic equality, and at first not of political equality, yet it has been a
land of liberty and individualism. In fact, this characteristic of American
life has been one of the first factors in the destruction of social and
economic equality and the creation of social aristocracy and economic
plutocracy. The original pioneers of the United States preferred liberty
70
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to equality. They believed in individualism and laissez-faire no matter
what the consequences. Of course in time the consequences became very
serious; and it was this which gradually forced the United States
supreme court to reconstruct American constitutional doctrine, even though
it was at the expense of personal liberty, so as to eliminate some of the
terrors of individualism, through subjecting it to external political social
control.
However, there have been two schools of thought with reference to this
matter. One school of thought throughout United States history has
continued to believe in the old shibboleth of individualism and personal
liberty, while the other school has believed it more important to create an
ideal social order. Yet these two schools of thought have not been so far
apart as it might seem. Both have believed in the use of governmental
power. The difference between the two schools has for the most part been
this, that the first school has believed in using governmental power for the
protection of the personal liberty of business men, while the other school
has believed in the use of governmental power to control the personal
liberty of business men.
The constitutional convention was dominated by the first school of
thought. One of its chief purposes was the establishment of a constitution
which would protect personal liberty against political social control. The
original constitution did not say this in so many words, but it is not
difficult to read it between the lines. The framers of the original constitution by the division of powers between the states and the federal government, division of powers between the various branches of the federal
government, and their scheme of checks and balances not only wanted to
establish a form of government which would prevent usurpation of autocratic power by any branch of government, but also to set up a government
so weak that it could offer a minimum of interference with personal liberty.
In this indirect way they hamstrung the federal government so as to make
it incapable of offering any great danger to the personal liberty of the
pioneers. The personal liberty of certain individuals, as for example the
creditor class, was directly protected against any social control, through
such clauses in the constitution as the clause forbidding a state from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts, the fugitive slave clause,
and the clause making all debts contracted before the adoption of the
constitution as valid against the United States as under the confederation.
The supreme court has been dominated now by one now by the other
school of thought. The justices who have believed in, and tried to protect,
personal liberty, especially that of business men, have been the justices
dominating the court in the periods of Chief Justice Marshall; of Justices
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Field and Peckham and Chief Justice Fuller; and of Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter. And the justices who have
believed in and have extended social control by government to delimit
liberty, especially of business men, for the establishment of an ideal social
order have been the justices dominating the court in the periods of Chief
Justice Taney and Justice Miller; of Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and
Hughes; and of Justices Stone, Cardozo, and the recent appointees of
President F. D. Roosevelt. The same division which has existed between
the justices of the supreme court has also existed between the chief executives and other political leaders of the United States. The people opposed
to social control have generally been labelled conservatives and those
favouring social control, liberals.
Chief Justice Marshall did not do much in the way of limiting the
powers of the federal government. .Perhaps one reason for this was
because the federal government was not as yet undertaking to exercise
much social control. He did, however, very greatly limit the powers of the
various state governments through the use of the contract clause. This
clause forbade any state from passing a law which would impair the obligation of a contract. He held that this guarantee protected individuals not
only against a law which would impair the obligation of the executory
contracts of private individuals, but the executory contracts of state governments, and even the obligation found in executed contracts of individuals
and state governments.7 3 Probably Chief Justice Marshall would have
made the contract clause protect even freedom of contract, but he could
7
not carry the rest of the supreme court along with him on this point. 1
7
However, in his celebrated Dartmouth College decision " he did succeed
in carrying the rest of the court with him in extending the contract clause
to the protection of the personal liberty of corporations by holding that
the charters granted to corporations were contracts, though executed, and,
for some strange reason, not subject to the power of taxation, the power
of eminent domain, or the police power.7 6 Because of this, corporations
enjoyed almost complete freedom from social control for about sixty years.
This did much to encourage the corporate form of business organization
and to make United States civilization a corporate civilization. Marshall
also protected the personal liberty of business men to some extent through
the commerce clause and other provisions in the constitution, but his great
work in so doing occurred in connexion with the contract clause.
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The work begun by Chief Justice Marshall was continued by the
justices who dominated the supreme court in the period of Justices Field
and Peckham and Chief Justice Fuller. Justice Field, while a dissenting
judge in the period of Chief Justice Taney and Justice Miller, had tried
to use the United States privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
formal amendment for the protection of personal liberty against state
action, but he failed by a narrow margin. 7 However, in the late eighties
and early nineties after a change in the personnel of the court, he succeeded
in making the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment do all that
he had wanted to make the United States privileges and immunities clause
do,78 that is, protect personal liberty against state action, on the theory that
such state action would as a matter of substance deprive persons of their
life, or liberty, or property without due process of law. To climax this
constitutional development, Justice Field and his associates extended the
protection of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
protection of the property rights of corporations.7 ' This meant that personal liberty would be protected, or social control allowed as the personnel
of the supreme court might change. So long as Justice Field and those
agreeing with him dominated the supreme court, it meant a minimum of
social control. A conspicuous illustration of the prohibition of social
control was found in the refusal of the supreme court in an opinion by
Justice Peckham to allow New York to control the hours of labour in
bakeries.8 ' Justice Field and his disciples also protected the personal
liberty of business men by the commerce clause and other clauses in the
constitution. For example, Chief Justice Fuller, more than any other
justice, succeeded by the use of the commerce clause in protecting the
personal liberty of brewers and distillers against state prohibition laws.8 '
In that period of United States constitutional history when Justices
Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter dominated the
supreme court, the protection of personal liberty of business men was, if
anything, even greater than it had been in the period of Justices Field and
Peckham and Chief Justice Fuller. Public utilities especially were protected under the due process clause against the regulatory power of public
77Slaughter-House Cases, (1873) 16 Wall. 36.
7
Davidson v. The Board of Administrators of the City of New Orleans, (1877) 96
U.S. 97; The Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Co. v. The State of Minnesota,
ex rel., (1890) 134 U.S. 418; Allgeyer et al. v. State of Louisiana, (1897) 165 U.S. 578.
79
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service commissions. In some. of these decisions they were given a net
rate of return of over 8 per cent 2 when interest rates on investments with
similar security ran no higher than 4 or 5 per cent and the companies were
able to sell their own bonds for 4 or 5 per cent and their preferred stock
for 6 per cent; and they were given this rate of return on a rate base of
reproduction cost, 3 though this rate base was more than double any amount
of money ever prudently invested in the enterprise. Freedom of contract
was protected under the due process clause against the guarantee of minimum wages,"4 and the due process clause was also invoked to protect
creditors against regulation by congress for the protection of farmers. 85
As though to outdo the work of Field, Fuller, and Peckham, the justices
of this period did what Justice Field failed to do-made the United States
privileges and immunities clause protect the general liberty of people against
state action.88
In the period of Chief Justice Taney, Justice- Miller, and Chief Justice
Waite the court did not believe in protecting personal liberty to the extent
that it has been protected by the justices heretofore considered. Chief
Justice Taney tried to limit the protection of corporations through a rule
of strict construction of their charters. He did not overrule the Dartmouth
College Case, but by his rule of strict construction he did protect the public
interest where charters were carelessly drawn.'
However, this rule of
strict construction did not accomplish much after charters were more
carefully drawn. Hence, to have more social control, it was necessary to
do more than use a rule of strict construction. Finally Miller, Waite, and
other justices modified the rule of the Dartmouth College Case by holding
that corporate charters were subject to the states' power of eminent
domain"8 and police power ;8" and that private contracts, though not public
contracts, were subject to the states' power of taxation.9" No further
modification of the Dartmouth College doctrine has been made up to the
present time, so that it is still constitutional law that the charters of
corporations are protected against the states' exercise contrary to a pro8
United Railways and
83

Electric Company of Baltimore v. West, (1930) 280 U.S. 234.
McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., (1926) 272 U.S. 400.
S4Adkins v. Children's Hospital, (1923) 261 U.S. 525.
' 5Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, (1935) 295 U.S. 555.
"9Colgate v. Harvey, (1935) 296 U.S. 404.
87
The CharlesRiver Bridge v. The Warren Bridge, et al., (1837) 11 Pet. 420.
8
"The West River Bridge Company v. Dix, (1848) 6 How. 507.
"8Munn v. Illinois (1876) 94 U.S. 113; Stone v. State of Mississippi, (1879) 101 U.S.
814; Butchers' Union Slaughter-House and Live Stock Landing Company v. Crescent City
Live Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company, (1884) 111 U.S. 746.
9°See Chanler v. Kelsey, (1907) 205 U.S. 466; Milliken v. United States, (1931)
283 U.S. 15.
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vision therein either of their power of taxation or their police power over
rates, or the franchises of corporations."1 But even with these exceptions
the changes made by the supreme court, even at first, were so great that
Justice Story and Chancellor Kent lost all hope of the constitutional
guardianship of the capitalistic system by the supreme court and prophesied
that the anti-capitalistic attitude of the court would arrest all new improvements and progress. It is interesting to note how ill-conceived and
repetitive gloomy forebodings may be.
In the period of Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Hughes the court was
dominated by justices who had the point of view of Chief Justice Taney,
Chief Justice Waite, and Justice Miller. In this period more social control became the order of the constitutional day. Yet they did not accomplish their purpose so much by modifying the fundamental law as to the
contract clause and the due process clause as by their method of applying
this fundamental law to" specific situations. Where Field, Fuller, and
Peckham in the period before them or Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland,
and Van Devanter in the period after them would not have been able to
find a sufficient social interest for the police power, or a sufficient public
purpose for the power of taxation, they were able to find such a social
interest and such a public purpose. For example, they were able to find
a sufficient social interest for the regulations of hours of labour,92 protection of natural resources, 3 protection of human resources, 94 protection
of general cultural progress, 5 and protection of individual life ;9" and a
sufficient public purpose for modified government ownership,97 and for
public needs where private enterprise was inadequate.9 9 But while the
liberal justices of this period were subjecting business men to all kinds of
social control, they were at the same time protecting the personal liberty
of individuals against governmental action where there were involved the
fundamental liberties of religion, 9 or speech, ° or due process as a matter
of legal procedure.'
"'St. Cloud Public Service Company v. City of. St. Cloud, (1924) 265 U.S. 352; Ohio
Public Service Co. v. Ohio, (1927) 274 U.S. 12; Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines v.
Lord, (1926) 271 U.S. 577.
nBunting v. State of Oregon, (1917) 243 U.S. 426.
93
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, (1908) 209 U.S. 349.
94
Buck v. Bell, (1927) 274 U.S. 200.
9
'Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, (1926) 272 U.S. 365.
6Second Employers' Liability Cases, (1912) 223 U.S. 1.
97Jones v. City of Portland, (1917) 245 U.S. 217; Green v. Frazier, (1920) 253 U.S.
233; Standard Oil Company v. City of Lincoln, (1927) 275 U.S. 504.
"9Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement District, (1923) 262 U.S. 710.
99Meyer v. State of Nebraska, (1923) 262 U.S. 390.
"'Pattersonv. Colorado, (1907) 205 U.S. 454.
191Frank v. Mangum, (1915) 237 U.S. 309; Moore v. Dempsey, (1923) 261 U.S. 86.
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In the present period of American constitutional law the dominancy
of the liberals is again manifest. The present liberal court controlled by
Justice Stone and the recent appointees of President F. D. Roosevelt has
a constitutional point of view corresponding very closely to that of Justices
Holmes and Brandeis in the period from 1910 to 1922; Chief Justice Taney
and Justice Miller from the time of the civil war to the late eighties; and
in many respects, especially in connexion with the federal government's
interstate commerce power, with that of Chief Justice Marshall in the
period dominated by him prior to the civil war. Their point of view is
diametrically opposed to the constitutional point of view of Justices Butler,
McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter, who generally controlled the
court from 1922 to 1936; Justices Field and Peckham and Chief Justice
Fuller, who generally dominated the court from the late eighties to 1910;
and to Chief Justice Marshall and his court so far as concerns the protection of corporations under the contract clause.
The liberals today, as always, are protecting the fundamental interests
of personal liberty guaranteed by the bill of rights, if anything, even more
than the conservatives would do. For example, under the due process
clause as a matter of substance they have protected freedom of speech, even
to the extent of protecting the circulation of leaflets" 2 and the practice of
picketing ;103 religious liberty;104 and the privilege of peaceable assemblage;105 and under the due process clause as a matter of procedure they
have protected an accused against torture. 6 They also under the equal
protection clause have protected negroes in their right to a legal education
against state discrimination where such education is provided only through
the payment of tuition for study outside the state. 07
The present liberal court, where fundamental rights are not involved,
has permitted more social control both by the state governments and the
federal government. In all of the periods the supreme court has been
fairly liberal towards the use of the power of eminent domain, and the
present court has continued this policy.'08 The greatest liberality has
occurred in the case of the police power. The court has upheld a state
"02Lovell v. City of Griffin, (1938) 303 U.S. 444.
103
Thornhill v. State of Alabama, (1940) 310 U.S. 88.
i°4Cantwell v. State of Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296. But cf. Minersville School
Dist.05
v. Gobitis, (1940) 310 U.S. 586.
' Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization et al., (1939) 307 U.S. 496.
'6White v. State of Texas, (1940) 310 U.S. 530.
'07State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, (1938) 305 U.S. 337.
108
United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians of West River Reservation in Wyoming,
(1938) 304 U.S. 111; Danforth v. United States, (1939) 308 U.S. 271.
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It has upheld a second federal Agricultural
minimum wage law.'
Adjustment Act"' and the Social Security Act". and the federal government's power over interstate commerce" 2 to such an extent that it repudiated most of the work on interstate commerce of such Justices as Butler,
McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter.113 It has also been very
liberal so far as the police power of the states has been concerned." 4 It
has shown even as great liberality in the matter of state and federal taxation. It has relaxed the rule against reciprocal immunity from taxation
of the state and federal governments and has substituted for it a rule of

reciprocal non-discriminatory taxation."' It has permitted use taxes" 6
and sales taxes".7 by the buyer's state on goods shipped in interstate commerce and has reversed its prior position as to jurisdiction to tax
intangibles,"" so as again to permit multiple taxation of intangibles by
different states."'

It also has reversed the position of its predecessors on

the scope of the United States privileges and immunities clause, so as to
go back to the position taken by the court in the time of Justice Miller.' 20
This case overruled
'ogWest Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish,(1937) 300 U.S. 379.
the case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital, (1923) 261 U.S. 525, and inferentially Morehead v. People of New York ex rel. Tipaldo, (1936) 298 U.S. 587.
h"Mulford v. Smith, (1939) 307 U.S. 38.
"'Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Company, (1937) 301 U.S. 495; Charles C.
Steward Machine Company v. Davis, (1937) 301 U.S. 548.
"2National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., (1937) 301
U.S. 1; Kentucky Whip and Collar Company v. Illinois Central RailroadCompany, (1937)
299 U.S. 334; The Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, (1937) 301 U.S.
103.
"'3Hammer v. Dagenhart, (1918) 247 U.S. 251; Railroad Retirement Board et al. v.
Alton Railroad Company et al., (1935) 295 U.S. 330; Carterv. CarterCoal Company et al.,
(1936) 298 U.S. 238; Adair v. United States, (1908) 208 U.S. 161; Coppage v. State of
Kansas, (1915) 236 U.S. 1.
u"Clason v. State of Indiana, (1939) 306 U.S. 439; Kelly v. State of Washington ex
rel. Foss Company, Inc., (1937) 302 U.S. 1; Milk Control Board of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania v. Eisenberg Farm Products, (1939) 306 U.S. 346.
"'James v. Dravo Contracting Company, (1937) 302 U.S. 134; Graves v. People of
New York ex rel. O'Keefe, (1939) 306 U.S. 466; State Tax Commission of Utah et al. v.
Van Cott, (1939) 306 U.S. 511; Helvering v. Gerhardt, (1938) 304 U.S. 405; Allen v.
Regents of University System of Georgia, (1938) 304 U.S. 439. These cases have expressly
overruled the earlier case of Collector v. Day, (1871) 11 Wall. 113.
"'Henneford et al. v. Silas Mason Company et al., (1937) 300 U.S. 577.
"'McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., (1939) 309 U.S. 33.
" 8First National Bank of Boston v. State of Maine, (1932) 284 U.S. 312.
"'Curry v. McCanless, (1939) 307 U.S. 357; Graves v. Elliott, (1939) 307 U.S. 383.
"Madden v. Commonwealth of Kentucky et al., (1940) 309 U.S. 83, overruling
Colgatev. Harvey, (1935) 296 U.S. 404. For further discussion of the work of the present
Supreme Court see H. E. Willis, "Gibbons v. Ogden Then and Now" in 28 Kentucky
Law Journal (1940), at pp. 280 ff.; H. E. Willis, "Constitution Making by the Supreme
Court since March 29, 1937" in 15 Indiana Law Journal (1940), at pp. 179 ff.
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What of the future? Will the pendulum of judicial preference continue
to swing back and forth from personal liberty to social control? The
safest answer is, yes; but perhaps it will gradually swing more and more
to social control and to the protection of personal liberty by social control
against the action of a few industrialists and financiers.

Yet no final

solution of this problem can come for long years in the future. The solution will have to wait the event of changing future economic and social
conditions. But of one thing we can be sure-the supreme court must
correct the mistake, made by some foreigners and some of our own business magnates, of identifying personal liberty with capitalism, which already
has to so large an extent destroyed free enterprise and individualism.
HUGH EVANDER WILLIS

Indiana University School of Law.

